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BRIEF OF APPELLANT E. D. SHELLEDY
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction

of

this

based on Rules 3 and 4,

matter

Utah Rules

is

before the Supreme Court

of Appellate

Procedure, and

Section 78-2-2, Utah Code Annotated. The parties believe that the
trial

court's

ruling

alternatively, the

resolved

trial court

all

issues

before

certified the

it,

but,

ruling for appeal

pursuant to Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The issues presented for review arise out of the question of
the

validity

property,

and

of

a

the

purported
subsequent

1984

final

taxation

property.
1

and

May tax sale of the
ownership

of the

The trial court ruled on cross-motions for summary judgment.
All issues are purely legal conclusions.
on

each

is,

therefore,

a

review

The

for

standard of review

correctness,

deference accorded the trial court's decision, and all

with

no

facts and

inferences therefrom are construed in the light most favorable to
appellant.
1989).

Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. State, 779 P.2d 634 (Utah

See, Argument Point I.

More specifically, the issues are as follows:
1.

Did the

trial court err in upholding the 1984 tax sale

by Salt Lake County in the face of
void

for

lack

of

jurisdiction

federal government's agency,

the

Shellesdy's claim

that it was

because of the immunity of the
Small

Business Administration

(hereinafter SBA).
2.

Did the trial court err in ruling that Shelledy's claim

against the 1984 tax sale was barred by

the special

statutes of

limitations?
3.

Did the

trial court err in ruling that Shelledy lacked

standing to dispute the validity of the 1984 tax sale?
STATUTES WHOSE INTERPRETATION MAY BE DETERMINATIVE
Utah Code Annotated, Sections:
78-12-5.1 Seizure or possession within seven
years — Proviso — Tax title.
No action for the recovery of real property
or for the possession
thereof shall be
maintained, unless
the plaintiff or his
predecessor was seized or possessed of such
property
within
seven
years
from the
commencement
of
such
action; provided,
however, that with respect to actions or
defenses brought or
interposed
for the
recovery or possession of or to quiet title

2

or determine the ownership of real property
against the holder of a tax title to such
property, no such action or defense shall be
commenced or interposed more than four years
after the date of the tax deed, conveyance,
or transfer creating such tax title unless
the person commencing or interposing such
action or defense or his predecessor has
actually occupied or been in possession of
such property within four years prior to the
commencement or interposition of such action
or defense or within one year from the
effective date of this amendment.
78-12-5.2.
Holder
of
tax
titleLimitations of action or defense — Proviso.
No action or defense for the recovery or
possession of real property or to quiet title
or determine the ownership thereof shall be
commenced or interposed against the holder of
a tax title after the expiration of four
years from the date of the sale, conveyance
or transfer of such tax title to any county,
or directly to any other purchaser thereof at
any public or private tax sale and after the
expiration of one year from the date of this
act.
Provided, however, that this section
shall not bar any action or defense by the
owner of the legal title to such property
where he or his predecessor has actually
occupied or been in actual possession of such
property
within
four
years
from
the
commencement or interposition of such action
or defense. And provided further, that this
section shall not bar any defense by a city
or town, to an action by the holder of a tax
title, to the effect that such city or town
holds a lien against such property which is
equal or superior to the claim of the holder
of such tax title.
78-12-5.3.
"action."

Definitions

of

"tax

title" and

(1) The term "tax title" as used in §78-125.1 and §59-2-1364, and the related amended
§§ 78-12-5, 78-12-7, and 78-12-12, means any
title to real property, whether valid or not,
which
has
been
derived through or is
dependent upon any sale,
conveyance, or
transfer of property in the course of a
3

statutory proceeding for the liquidation of
any tax levied against the property whereby
the property is relieved from a tax lien.
(2) The word "action" as used in these
sections includes counterclaims and crosscomplaints and all civil actions wherein
affirmative relief is sought.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The plaintiff,

E. D.

Shelledy, filed

a complaint to quiet

title in Third District Court in and for Salt Lake County against
various

defendants

interest in
County for

who

the real

estate in

or

might

otherwise

dispute, and

claim an

against Salt Lake

recovery of taxes on the property which Shelledy paid

under protest.

R. 2-22.

Shelledy filed
1984 tax

claimed

sale was

a motion

for summary

judgment claiming the

void because of the sovereign immunity of the

United States and its agencies and instrumentalities, and that no
taxes

could

accrue

while

the

SBA

held

record

title to the

property and, therefore, Shelledy was entitled quiet title and to
a refund of tax monies paid under protest.
Salt Lake
claiming
challenge

County responded

either
to

that

the

the

tax

R. 69-84, 101-114.

and moved for summary judgment,

1984

tax

sale

was

valid,

or any

sale was barred by limitations statutes,

and/or that Shelledy lacked standing to challenge the validity of
the 1984 tax sale.

R. 85-98, 119-127.

The trial court denied Shelledy's motion and granted that of
Salt Lake

County for

memoranda. R.

130.

the reasons

argued in

Final judgment

ruling on January 17, 1990, and

the
4

Salt Lake County's

was entered
trial

on the court's

court alternatively

certified it

for appeal under Rule 54(b).

filed a Notice of
February 9,

Appeal

from

the

trial

R. 131-132.
court's

Shelledy

decision on

1990, seeking reversal of the trial court's decision

and a remand ordering the trial court to enter judgment
of Shelledy.

in favor

R. 136-137.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

The real property which is the subject of the dispute herein
is described as:
Beginning at a point which is north 660 ft.
from the southwest corner of the northwest
quarter of Sec. 29, Township 3 South, Range 1
East, Salt
Lake Base and Meridian, and
running thence north 220 ft.; thence west 990
ft.; then south 220 ft.; thence east 990 ft.
to the point of beginning.
Subject to a 49.5 ft. right of way for Utah
Lake Irrigation Co. canal and to a right of
way over the east portion for 1000 East
Street,
and is situated in Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
Immediately prior

to January

R. 72.

14, 1981, record title to the

property was held by Clair R. and Virginia S. Pearson.

Salt Lake

County claimed a lien on the property for prior unpaid ad valorem
taxes and the SBA held a mortgage on the property.
On January 14, 1981, the SBA
property by

R. 72, R. 78.

acquired record

title to the

quit-claim deed from the Pearsons which was recorded

in Book 5246, page 836, as entry number 3563244. R. 72, R. 78.
On May 23, 1984, Salt Lake
property to

Edward Lore

R. 72, R. 79.

by tax

County purported

to convey the

deed at

May tax sale.

a final

Edward Lore then conveyed his interest, if any, to

the property to various other defendants as follows:
5

On

or

about

May

23,

1984, defendant

conveyed by Quit Claim Deed an
interest,

if

any,

to

Edward

undivided 8/9's

defendants

Lore

of his

Alan Parsons, Erin

Parsons, Harry Deckered, Kent C. Bangerter, Roy Hockin,
and

Merit

Distributing,

William Conover

and Fiduciary

William Conover,
his interest,

Inc., and to non-defendants

on or

if

any,

Fiduciary Financial

Financial Services Inc.

about July
to

10, 1984, conveyed

defendant

1984,

Defendant Edward

conveyed

C. Kunz.

Services conveyesd its interest, if

any, on or about March 21, 1985, to
McBride.

David

his

defendant Lloyd V.

Lore, on or about June 28,

remaining

interest,

if

any, to

defendant Merit Distributing, Inc. by Quit Claim Deed.
R. 72-73; R.80, 81, 82, 83.
On or about December 28, 1988, the SBA conveyed its interest
in the property to plaintiff Shelledy
which

Shelledy

claims

fee

by quit-claim

ownership

deed, under

of the property.

R. 73,

R. 84.
On or

about

$6,007.39 to

22,

1989,

Shelledy

paid

under protest

the Salt Lake County Treasurer for taxes claimed by

Salt Lake County
Shelledy

May

disputes

to

have

because

accrued
of

the

on

the

property

but which

tax immunity of the federal

government while the property was owned by the SBA.

R. 73.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Shelledy asserts that once the
property

in

January,

1981,

Salt
6

SBA

obtained

Lake

County

title

to the

was

without

jurisdiction to either foreclose its tax
taxes against

the property

lien or

assess further

because of the sovereign immunity of

the United States and its agencies and instrumentalities
the SBA.

such as

The tax sale and deed of May, 1984, were therefore void

and transferred nothing to those claiming thereunder.
Further, Shelledy asserts that
do

not

apply

in

the

instant

the statutes

action

to

of limitations

bar

his claim, or,

alternatively, if the statutes do apply, they could not run while
title was held by the SBA,
Finally,

Shelledy

claims

that

constitutional rights of another

and

he

is

that

not

he

asserting the

has

standing to

dispute the validity of the 1984 tax sale and deed,
ARGUMENT
POINT I:
The

instant

action

STANDARD OF REVIEW
comes

before the court upon the trial

court's ruling on cross-motions for summary judgment.

The trial

court granted defendant Salt Lake County's motion and denied that
of the plaintiff, E.

D. Shelledy.

Shelledy

believes the trial

court erred on both counts.
Upon review

of a

motion for

Court applies the same standard
court, Durham

v. Marqetts,

summary judgment, the Supreme

as

571 P.2d

that

applied

by

the trial

1332 (Utah 1977), that is,

the party against who judgment is granted is entitled to have all
the facts presented, and all inferences fairly arising therefrom,
considered in a light most favorable to him.
S & H Ins. Co., 714 P.2d 648 (Utah 1986).
7

Geneva

Pipe Co. v.

Only when there exists

no genuine dispute as
entitled to

to

judgment as

material

a matter

grant summary judgment•
Thornock v.

any

facts

P.2d 934

a

party is

of law should the trial court

Rule 56, Utah Rules

Cook, 604

and

of Civil Procedure,

(Utah 1979).

Since the appeal

presents a review only of legal conclusions, the Court is free to
reappraise the

trial court's conclusions for correctness without

according any deference to
Blue

Cross

&

Blue

the conclusions

Shield

of the

trial court.

v. State, 779 P.2d 634 (Utah 1989);

Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245 (Utah 1988).
As the trial court apparently accepted all the
Salt Lake

arguments of

County, Shelledy will address each issue raised in the

trial court and on

which he

believes the

trial court

erred in

ruling in favor of Salt Lake County and against him.
POINT II: THE FINAL MAY TAX SALE
WAS VOID BECAUSE THE COUNTY LACKED
JURISDICTION TO FORECLOSE ITS LIEN
The SBA

is an agency of the federal government, having been

established by act of
and

placed

under

Congress now

the

President of the United
Appeals has

referred to

codified at

15 U.S.C. §633,

general direction and supervision of the
States.
the SBA

The

Tenth

Circuit

Court of

as a "non-incorporated federal

agency, ...an integral part of the United States government... .M
United States v. Mel's Locker, Inc., 346 F.2d 168, 169 (10th Cir.
1965).

The

court

also

reiterated that the SBA "has the full

sovereign immunity of the United States, unless such immunity has
been waived by congressional action."

Id. at 169.

A proceeding against property in which the United States has
8

an interest is a suit against

the United

States.

Minnesota v.

United States, 305 U.S. 382, 595 S.Ct. 292, 83 L.Ed. 235 (1939).
On or

about January

14, 1981,

the SBA became record title

owners of the property in dispute by way of Quit
the prior

Claim Deed from

record title owners, Clair R. and Virginia S. Pearson.

At the time of the conveyance, Salt Lake
against the

property for

County held

a tax lien

unpaid ad valorem taxes having accrued

prior to the time of the conveyance to the SBA.
Once the SBA
deed, the

acquired

ownership

interest

under

the 1981

sovereign immunity of the federal government, and thus

the SBA, barred the enforcement of
County, and

its attempt

to enforce

May, 1984, tax sale was void.

the

tax

the lien

lien

by

Salt Lake

through the final

United States v. Alabama, 313 U.S.

274, 61 S.Ct. 1011, 85 L.Ed. 1327 (1940); United States v. Pierce
County, 193 F.529 (D.C. Cir. 1912).
Court in

Although

the U.

S. Supreme

United States v. Alabama, supra, upheld the validity of

the tax lien itself, the Court left no

doubt as

to the immunity

of the government with respect to the county's efforts to enforce
its lien through a tax sale:
With respect to the tax sales the case has a
different aspect.
The proceedings in the
county court for the sales of the lands were
taken and the decrees were rendered after the
United States had become the owner of the
tracts.
A proceeding against property in
which the United States has an interest is a
suit against the United States. [Citation
omitted.]
The
United
States
was an
indispensable party to proceedings for the
sale of the lands, and in the absence of its
consent
to
the
prosecution
of
such
proceedings, the county court was without
jurisdiction and its decrees, the tax sales

and the certificates
the State were void.

of

purchase

issued to

United States v. Alabama, supra, at U.S. 282.
The

United

dispositive of
May,

1984,

States

v.

Alabama

the issue

of the

sale,

the

tax

as

decision

validity or

is

invalidity of the

United States has not given its

consent to such proceedings which would purport to
its agency,

the SBA,

completely

deprive it or

of such interests in real property.

Thus,

the tax sale and deed are void, and all the defendants' claims of
interest in

the property,

either directly under the tax deed or

as a derivative claim thereunder, should

be declared

invalid by

order of the court quieting title in the plaintiff.
POINT III: NO TAX COULD BE ASSESSED
WHILE SBA HELD RECORD TITLE TO THE PROPERTY.
The principle that federally-owned property may not be taxed
by a state
expressly

or

its

waived

hundred and

fifty

(4 Wheat.) 316

political

by

the

federal

years.

(1819).

subdivisions

unless

government

M'Culloch

v.

immunity is

goes back over a

Maryland,

17

The Utah tax code implicitly recognizes

this immunity in the exemptions of Section 59-2-1101(2) (a).
immunity has

U. S.

been specifically

SBA, United States v.

This

applied to property owned by the

Schwartz, 278

F.Supp. 328,

330 (S.D.N.Y.

1968), and has been held to apply to property which was once held
as mere

security for

acquired in

a loan

fee simple

(not immune)

by the

SBA.

but was subsequently

United States v. Roanoke,

258 F.Supp. 415 (W.D. Va. 1966).
Thus, Salt Lake County was without authority to assess taxes
10

against

the

property

during

the

time

the

SBA

was

record

titleholder thereto, from January 14, 1981, to December 28, 1988.
No lien for taxes during that time may attach to the property and
plaintiff is entitled to reimbursement of all amounts

paid under

protest in May, 1989, for those years, less the amount of the tax
lien existing on the property as of January 14, 1981.
POINT IV: STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
CANNOT VALIDATE THE VOID DEED,
Defendant Salt

Lake

apparently accepted,

County

argues,

the

trial court

that Shelledy's claim to quiet title to the

property

in

question

statutes

of

the

is

Utah

barred

Code

by

thereon fails

on either

cannot create

title from

the

the trial

of two bases:
a deed

jurisdiction, and

special

limitations

at Sections 78-12-5.1 et seq.

defendants' limitations argument and

lack of

and

The

court's reliance

the limitations statutes

which was

absolutely void for

the limitations time period could not

commence to run while the title to the

property was

in the SBA,

an agency entitled to the full immunity of the United States.
Under

the

holding

of

the

United States Supreme Court in

United States v. Alabama, supra, once
acquired by
thereof,

the

jurisdiction

the federal
states
over

government or,

or

the

their

property

Congress, and any proceedings
County, such
In

such

a

jurisdiction,

as the
case

May 1984

where

good

title to

title

the

real property is

in this case, an agency

political

subdivisions

except

express consent of

to enforce

by

the lien

tax sale, were void.
tax

cannot
11

sale

is

void

lack

of Salt Lake
Id. at 282.
for

lack

of

be created under the void tax

deed

simply

by

the

passage

of

time

under

a

statute

of

limitations.
A void deed is a nullity, having no legal effect.
is void, as in this action, as opposed to merely
invalid

in

law

for

any

purpose

insufficient to create a legal title,
to those

claiming under

it.

If a deed

voidable, it is

whatsoever,

and affords

is

legally

no protection

23 AmJur2d Deeds, §188.

See also,

P.Lear, Utah's Short Statutes of Limitations for Tax Titles: The
Continuing Specter

of Lyman

v. National

Need for Remedial Legislation, 76
wherein the
voidable,

author notes
for

special or

reasons

that where
such

short statutes

as

property

law

in

his

467 (1976),

treatise
to

defect, the

favoring tax deeds do

scholar in

application

457,

jurisdictional

of limitations

Similarly, another noted

limitations is without

L.Rev.

a deed is void, not merely

a

not run.

indicates

BYU

Mortgage Bond Corp.—A

the area

that

void

a

of real

statute

deeds.

of

Vol. 5B,

Thompson, Real Property, §2766 (1978).
The Utah

Supreme Court

has tacitly acknowledged that these

statutes of limitation do not apply in circumstances
instant

case

where

jurisdiction.
(1955), the

a

deed

is

such as the

void

because

of

lack

of

In Hansen v. Morris, 3 Utah

2d 310,

283 P.2d 884

court confirmed that situations involving void deeds

such as in this action were outside the scope of special statutes
of limitations:
It appears obvious that such sections were
enacted to eliminate the objections pointed
out in the Toronto case, and were intended to
prevent raising of defenses based on failure
12

to comply with statutory steps leading down
the long road traversable in perfecting tax
titles•.• .
•• •

In passing, we do not wish it understood that
our decision is applicable to conveyances
void on their face, such as those containing
no grantor, grantee, description, etc., or to
those that may be forged or the like, but
only to those valid on their face, as here,
and executed by the same authority that could
have passed good title if each and every
statutory step in perfecting a tax title had
been followed,
without
the
aid
of a
limitations statute.
Id. at 313 and 315.

[Emphasis added.]

More recently,

the Utah

Court of Appeals dealt with a case

which implicitly recognized that such limitations statutes do not
apply in

situations where

property.

In Baxter

a county lacked jurisdiction over the

v. Utah

Department of

Transportation, 783

P.2d 1045 (Ut.App. 1989), cert, denied 133 U.A.R. 28 (Utah 1990),
the Court of Appeals
piece of

land on

party relied
other party

on a

was faced

with a

the border

of Weber

tax deed

from 1969

claimed that

the property

dispute over

title to a

and Davis counties.

One

from Davis

The

County.

was in Weber County and,

hence, not subject to Davis County's jurisdiction.
The Court

of

recognized these
to

strengthen

However,

after

Appeals,
statutes of

these

in

its

footnote

these

much-disputed

had these

tax

deeds.

statutory supports for tax

titles, and in spite of the fact that the case
been resolved

in Baxter

limitations as exhibiting a desire

historically

acknowledging

first

could have easily

limitations statutes applied, the Court

of Appeals went on to analyze the case under the
13

assumption that

the outcome would be determined by whether the land was under the
jurisdiction of Weber County or Davis County.
Thus, in
that where

Baxter, the

Appeals Court,

by implication, found

a county lacks jurisdiction over property, a tax deed

to that property by

such county

cannot be

validated by

a mere

lapse of time.
It is clear that these limitations statutes were enacted for
the purpose of overcoming procedural defects,
executed

affidavits

or

undeputized

sale, which would be voidable during
jurisdictional defect
a tax

deed

void,

such as improperly

officers

conducting a tax

the limitations

period.

A

such as in the instant case, which renders

is

beyond

the

scope

of

such

statutes of

limitations.
Alternatively, even assuming, arguendo, that the limitations
statutes could apply to a void deed, the statutes could not begin
to run

until after

the SBA transferred title to the property to

plaintiff on December 28, 1988.
statute

of

government.

limitations

does

It is firmly established
not

51 AmJur 2d Limitation

run

against

of Actions,

the

that a

sovereign

§409.

This is

true with regard to the United States or its officers or agencies
unless Congress has clearly manifested a contrary intention.

Id.

at §414.
In Nichols

v. Council,

51 Ark

26, 9 SW 305 (1888), it was

specifically held that a limitations statute could not
motion
States.

while

the

title

to

Similarly, in Oaksmith

property
v.
14

was

be put in

still in the United

Johnston,

92

U.S.

343, 23

L.Ed,

682

(1875),

it

was

held

that a statute of limitations

raises no bar to an action by the government or its grantee in an
action to

recover possession

of real property where legal title

was in the United States.
Applying this well-established rule to the
the limitations

period can

instant case, if

run at all in favor of the void deed

herein, it cannot commence to run until the date the title to the
property

was

transferred

from

the SBA to plaintiff, December,

1988, and therefore affords no protection to defendants.
POINT V: SHELLEDY IS ENTITLED
TO RAISE ISSUE OF THE VALIDITY
OF THE TAX DEED.
Defendant Salt Lake County raises the defense that plaintiff
lacks standing

to claim the constitutional rights and immunities

of the federal government.

This standing argument is clearly not

applicable to the factual circumstances of this case.
It is

well-settled that the validity of a tax title or of a

tax sale can be assailed by
under

whom

he

claims

had

one who
some

title

property at the time of the sale.
164 S.W.2d

281 (1942);

450 (1937); Hopper v.
(1931).

Standing

to

v.

Brunner,

or interest in the
Mo. 1154,

183

challenge

Ark.

the

469,

tax

at the

36

S.W.2d 398

sale or deed is not

time of

the disputed

those who claim under that original owner.

Preston v. Iron County,
Morcom

or those

Smith v. Whitney, 105 Mont. 523, 74 P.2d
Chandler,

extends to

to

that he

Gee v. Bullock, 349

limited to just the original owner
sale, but

can show

30

105 Wis.2d
Wash.App.
15

346, 314

N.W.2d 131 (1981);

532, 635 P.2d 778 (Wash.App.

1981) . Each successor is
title.

in

privity

with

his

predecessor in

Id.

In

the

case

of

Daniell

v.

Sherrill, 48 So.2d 736 (Fla.

1950), the Florida Supreme Court addressed a situation similar to
the

instant

action,

title to land owned

where

by the

the

State purported to grant a tax

United States.

In

arriving at its

decision, the Florida Court stated:
The
tax
deeds here under consideration
recited that there were taxes due upon the
property for three years and that the State
granted title to appellants' predecessors.
Concededly, the tax deeds were invalid, since
the United States owned the lands.
The
United States, or any purchaser from the
United States other than the State of Florida
would be entitled to challenge the validity
of the tax deeds and the correctness of the
recitals thereof,... .
Id. at 7 39.

[Emphasis added.]

Likewise, Shelledy

is entitled

to challenge the tax sale

and deed in dispute herein because of his position of

grantee of

the SBA.
The doctrine

cited by

defendant Salt

Lake County, and the

cases cited in its Memorandum are clearly inapposite

to the case

herein.
The rule
county

is

a

controversies"

stated by the U.S. Supreme Court and raised by the
corollary

closely

requirement

Court from issuing advisory
directly before

the Court

that

related
prohibits

opinions
in an
16

to

on

the

"cases

and

the federal Supreme

issues

which

are not

actual controversy between the

parties before the court.
The major federal cases decided by the United States Supreme
Court and

cited by

this "cases and
McGowan v.
that

the county in its Memorandum are examples of

controversies"

Maryland, 366

Maryland's

guarantees

of

Sunday

closing

religious

alleged

For

only

laws

liberty

violated

(freedom

address

economic

such

were.

Constitutional

of
a

religion).

claim

unconstitutional

actions

even

though

Similarly, in United States v. Raines,

actions.

The

issues not

actually before

Oklahoma, 413

Court

because
the

because the

to what appellants'

362 U.S. 17 (1960), the district court had held the
act

The

damage to themselves, noting

that the record was devoid of indications as
religious beliefs

instance, in

U. S. 42 (1961), the appellants argued

Court, however, declined to
appellants

limitation.

it

case

might
itself

reversed,

civil rights

enjoin

purely private

involved

only official

finding itself loath to decide

the Court.

Again,

in Broadrick v.

U.S. 601 (1973), a case involving a constitutional

challenge of Oklahoma laws prohibiting political
state employees,

work of certain

the Court rejected the petitioners' standing to

raise constitutional questions of

the

statutes'

application to

other persons in other situations not before the court.
In the

instant case,

plaintiff is not trying to assert the

constitutional right of another.
the legal

effect of

a transaction

Plaintiff

is merely asserting

by the county which was void

and creates a cloud on his title to the property.

Such rights as

the SBA may have had to clear title were transferred to Shelledy,
17

its

grantee,

and

such

privity

entitlement to the relief sought.

is

the

basis

for Shelledy's

Chantler v. Wood, 430 P.2d 712

(Az.App. 1967).

To deny the grantee of property from the federal

government this

ability would

be, in effect, taking property of

the federal government without the consent of Congress,
would be

unable to

make marketable.
which impair

alienate property

which a grantee could not

Plaintiff has every right to

his claim

to title

since it

to the

challenge actions

property.

To deny him

this right would saddle the federal government with the burden of
itself quieting
an unlawful lien

title to any parcel of land having a question of
claim.

Congress

has

not

consented

to the

imposition of such a burden.
CONCLUSION
Appellant

E.

D.

Shelledy

respectfully requests the Court

reverse the decision of the trial court in its entirety and order
the trial

court to enter judgment quieting title to the property

in Shelledy
Salt lake

and against
County to

all defendants,

and ordering defendant

refund the monies paid to it under protest,

less the amount of the County's tax lien as of January 14, 1981.
Shelledy also
costs on

respectfully

requests

the

Court

award him

appeal and to direct the trial court to award him costs

in the trial court proceedings.
DATED June J7_, 1990.

ERIC P. HARTMAN
Attorney for Appellant
E. D. Shelledy
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FILED
DISTRICT COURT
ERIC P. HARTMAN, No. 1400
Attorney for Plaintiff
2120 South 1300 East, Suite 301
Salt Lake City, UT 84106
(801) 486-3751

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
E. D. SHELLEDY,
Plaintiff,

;1

O R D E R

vs.
EDWARD LORE, ALAN PARSONS,
ERIN PARSONS, ROY HOCKIN,
]
HARRY DECKERED, KENT C.
BANGERTER, LLOYD V. McBRIDE, ]
DAVID C. KUNZ, SUSAN S. KUN2, :
individual, MERIT DISTRIBUTING;
INC., a Utah corporation,
STATE TAX COMMISSION OF THE
]
STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE
i
COUNTY, and JOHN DOES I-X,

Civil No. 890901388 PR
Judge James Sawaya

Defendants.
Plaintiff E.

D. Shelledy's and defendant Salt Lake County's

Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment came on

regularly for hearing

on December 18, 1989, in the Third Judicial District Court in and
for Salt Lake County,
Plaintiff was

the Honorable

James S.

Sawaya presiding.

represented by his counsel, Eric P. Hartman. Salt

Lake County was represented by Deputy County Attorney
Sloan.

Mary Ellen

Counsel for various other defendants, Robert Liljenquist,

was present but did not argue.
The court, following argument and being fully advised in the
premises,

19

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1.

Salt

Lake

County's

Motion

for

Summary

granted on all issues on the bases and for the
its

memoranda;

and

plaintiff's

Judgment is

reasons stated in

Motion for Summary Judgment is

denied on all issues.
2.
title

Salt Lake County's May

to

the

property

in

1984

dispute

tax

sale

was

valid and

is quieted in the tax sale

purchaser or his successors in interest•
3.

The property

was

subject

to

taxation

by

Salt Lake

County during all times relevant herein.
4.

Plaintiff is

entitled to

a statutory lien against the

property for any tax payments made on the property.
5.
parties

The court's
herein#

or

ruling

resolves

alternatively,

reason for delay, directs entry of

all

the

issues

between all

court, finding no just

judgment on

the above claims

and certifies this Order as final for purposes of appeal pursuant
to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
DATED January / "Z 1990.
BY THE COURT:

1ES S. SAWAYJc
'Third District Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

MARY ELLEN SLOAN
Deputy County Attorney

ROBERT LILJ
Attorney at

20

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I certify that on January

, 1990, I mailed a copy of the

foregoing Order, U. S. mail, postage prepaid to the following:

Edward Lore, defendant
440 North 800 East
Kaysville, UT 84037

Mary
Salt
2001
Salt

Ellen Sloan
Lake County Attorney's Office
South State Street, IS3600
Lake City, UT 84190-1200

Robert C. Liljenquist
DAY & BARNEY
Attorney for defendants, Alan Parsons,
Erin Parsons, Roy Hockin, Lloyd V. McBride,
David C. Kunz, and Merit Distributing, Inc.
45 East Vine Street
Murray, UT 84107
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overhauled or inserted for the first time. Among the
latter was § 1 (17). See H. Rep. No. 1409, supra, p. 6.
But § 75 (r) also was left in the Act, and, as already indicated, its existence was not unknown to the revisors.
Its very presence in the statute after the revision is persuasive evidence that § 1 (17) was not intended to govern
proceedings under § 75.
We conclude that petitioner's activities must be tested
by the definition in § 75 (r) rather than by the one in
§ 1 (17). The judgment is reversed and the cause is
remanded to the Circuit Court of Appeals for consideration of other questions in light of our decision.
Reversed.
MR. JUSTICE STONE did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.

UNITED STATES r. ALABAMA.
No. 12, original. Argued April 28,1941.—Decided May 2G, 1941.
1. The law of Alabama fixes October 1st of each year ns the tax day
as of which real property shall be assessed for the taxes of the
succeeding tax year, and provides a statutory process whereby, in
due course, valuations of properties and amounts of tax are determined. Taxes are made liens on the properties taxed, relating
back to the tax day and continuing until the taxes have !>con paid.
The lien is effective not only against the owner on the tax day but
also against sub-sequent purchasers. Held:
(1) That the tax lien is not objectionable under the Federal Constitution as applied to a purchaser who bought on or after the tax
day and before the amount of the tax had been fixed by levy and
assessment. P. 27'.).
(2) The fact that the purrhacer, in such circumstaw % was the
United States did not invalidate the lien. P. 2S1.
(3) Such a lien can not be enforced against the Uniw-d States
without its consent. P. 2*1.
2. A proceeding against property in which the United Siat«- ha? an
interest is a suit against the United States. P. 282.
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was a suit brought in this Court by the United
States against the State of Alabama in which the plaintiff
sought to have removed, as clouds on its title, tax liens
imposed under the law of the State upon lands purchased
by the plaintiff.
The Court decrees that tax sales and certificates of purchase, resulting from proceedings in an Alabama county
court for enforcement of the liens, shall be set aside, but
in other respects the bill is dismissed.
THIS

Assistant Attorney General Littell, with whom Attorney General Jackson and Solicitor General Biddle were
on the brief, for the United States.
The lands were acquired before the time when, by
completion of levy and assessment, the amounts of state
taxes had been ascertained. They are therefore not subject to liens for the taxes.
Two things are requisite for the ascertainment of an
ad valorem tax: The tax rate must be fixed and the property must be valued. On October 1, 1936, only the state
tax rate was fixed. The lands had not been valued and
the county and school tax rates had not been fixed. And
when the three tracts were acquired by the United States,
the taxes were *till unascertained. If the assessments
had not been thereafter determined and the additional
levies made, the taxes would never have been imposed.
See Bannoti v. Burncs, 30 F. S92? 89S; Portland v.
Multnomah County, 135 Ore. 469, 473.
The ascertainment of the taxes after acquisition of the
land* by the United States, could not impose any liability upon the lands. The State could -till levy and
a«es* for the purpose of imposing a personal liability
on the former owners. But the property of the United
States is not subject to state taxation. Van Brocklin v.
Tennessee, 117 U. S. 151. 179-180; Clallam County v.
United States, 263 U. S. 341. 345: Lee v. Osceola Imp.
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Dist, 268 U. S. 643, 645; Mullen Benevolent Corp. v.
United States, 290 U. S. S9, 94-95.
The Alabama lien statute did not per se make the lands
liable for taxes. It neither fixes rates of taxation nor
enumerates subjects of taxation. It does*not impose
taxes but secures their payment. Unless taxes are imposed, § 372 accomplishes nothing. Cf., Heine v. Levee
Commissioners, 19 Wall. 655, 659. In re Opinions of the
Justices, 234 Ala. 358. The declaration that the lien
attaches as of October 1, when the procedure of imposing
the tax commences, does not do away with the necessity
of completing that procedure. Nor will it cure any defect of procedure. See Gaston v. Reconstruction Finance
Corporation, 237 Ala. I l l , 112; Lewis v. Burch, 215 Ala.
20,21; Laney v. Proctor, 236 Ala. 318, 320.
The statutory declaration of a lien for taxes imposes
no liability upon property conveyed to the United States
before, by completion of levy and assessment, the taxes
have been ascertained. Bannon v. Burnes, 39 F. 892,
897, 89S; United States v. Pierce County, 193 F. 529, 532533; Territory v. Perrvi, 9 Ariz. 316, 320; see, also.
United States v. City of Buffalo, 54 F. 2d 471, 474; cert,
den. 2S5 U. S. 550; United States v. Certain Lands in
City of St. Louis, Mo., 29 F. Supp. 92, 96; 3 Cooley, Taxation (4th ed. 1924), § 1232, n. 13, pp. 2454r-2455; Berg,
The Status of Taxes Rohtive to Land Acquired by the
United States, 16 Ore. L. Rev. 340-356; 48 L. R. A.
(X. S.) 70S-712. See also, New York v. Maclay, 2SS
U. S. 290, 294.
Xor does a declaration of lien like that of the Alabama
statute impose liability upon property when, before ascertainment of taxes, the power to tax is lost by reason
of acquisition of the property by a State or one of its
political subdivisions, State v. Snohomish County. 71
Wash. 320. 322-326; Portland v. Multnomah County, 135
Ore. 469, 473; City of Lnurcl v. Wccm*. 100 Miss. 335.
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340-341, or is lost because the property is disconnected
from the territory of the taxing power, Gillmor v. Dale,
27 Utah 372, 377; State ex rel. Hinson v. Nkkerson, 99
Neb. 517, 520, or because the legislature divests the taxing body of power to tax. Denver v. Research Bureau,
101 Colo. 140, 144 et acq. See, also, United States v.
Pierce County, 193 F. 529, 533.
The probate court was without jurisdiction to decree
that the lands of the United States be sold to pay the
taxes.
Messrs. / . Edward Thornton and iohn W. Lapsley,
Assistant Attorneys General of Alabama, with whom Mr.
Thomas S. Lawson, Attorney General, was on the brief,
for the State of Alabama.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE HUGHES

delivered the opinion of

the Court.
The United States brought this suit to quiet its title
to land in Macon County, Alabama. The complaint alleges that the State of Alabama is asserting liens as attaching to the land on October 1, 1936, for state and
county taxes for the tax year 1937; and further that the
State claims an interest in the land by reason of tax
sales and the issue to the State of certificates of purchase. The Government asks a decree declaring the
liens, tax sales and certificates of purchase to be invalid
and enjoining the State from asserting its claims. The
case was heard on bill and answer.
There are three tracts involved, which were conveyed
by the owners to the United States on October 1, 1930,
December 10, 1936, and March 10. 1937, respectively.
The applicable statute of Alabama: provides that
''From and after the first day of October «>i each year.
'Section o72, Act No. 194, General Acts Aialmm.i, }':£. p. .W. fc
as follows:
"From and after the first day of October of each yenr, when property becomes assessable the State shall have a lien upon each and
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when property becomes assessable the State shall have
a lien upon each and every piece or parcel of property
owned by any taxpayer for the payment of all taxes
which may be assessed against him . . . which lien shall
continue until such taxes are paid." The county is to
have a like lien for taxes assessed by it. These liens
are made superior to all other liens and may be enforced
by sale as provided in the Act.
Under the statute, the process of assessment for the tax
year 1937 began on October 1,1936. The grantors in the
above mentioned conveyances, as the respective owners
on that date, made their returns and in due course the
tax assessor listed and valued the several tracts.2 His
every piece or parcel of property owned by any taxpayer for the
payment of all taxes which may be assessed against him and upon
each piece and parcel of property real or personal assessed to owner
unknown which lien shall continue until such taxes are paid, and
the county shall have a like lien thereon for the payment of the
taxes which may be assessed by it; and if such property is within
the limits of a municipal corporation such municipal corporation
shall have a like hen thereon for the payment of the taxes which
may be assessed by it These liens shall be superior to all other
liens and shall exist in the order named and each of .-uch liens may be
enforced and foreclosed by sale for taxes as proviced in this Act,
ur as other hens upon property are enforced/'
The State also cites § SS74 of Article 6, Chapter 314, of the Code
of Alabama, 1923, which provides:
•'From and after the first day of October of each y<vr, the state
shall have a prior lien upon each and every piece or p-trcel of property, real or personal, for the payment of any and all taxes which
may be aj-sessed a?am?t the own<T. or upon such property, during th.it
year, for the u>e of the state; and the c«»un:y :h:ill h.»ve a like hen
thereon for the payment of the Taxes wlwh may b«* a-;< -cd r.^iin-t
such owner, or upon such property, durins; that yeir. for the use
of the county; and These liens shall exi-t as to all lands bid in by
the state at tax sales for the annual taxes thereafter a^e.-cd on
the value of the property so purchased, in the event of the tax title
failing/'
•Act No. 194. General Acts Alabama, 10.°,;>, § 1".), p. 27-4.
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valuations were certified as provided by the statute to
the county board of review, which by virtue of its authority tofixvaluations, made the definitive assessments.3
It appears that the board of review met on March 8,
1937, and adjourned on March 20, 1937. It also appears
that the rate for state taxes had been fixed by the statute,4 and the rate for county taxes was set on February
8,1937, under the authority given to the court of county
commissioners.5 The school district tax was approved
by the electors of the school district at an election held
on June 14, 1937. The taxes for the year 1937 became
payable on October 1, 1937, and became delinquent on
January 1, 1938.6 Proceedings were then instituted in
the county court for the sale of the lands, and under its
decrees the sales took place on June 12, 1939. The
lands were sold to the State and certificates of purchase
were issued accordingly.
First. The Government, invoking the principle that
lands owned by the United States cannot be taxed by a
State {Van Brocklin v. Tennessee, 117 U. S. 151), contends
that the asserted liens are without validity because at
the time the tracts were acquired by the United States
the amount of the taxes had not been ascertained, as the
values had not then been assessed and the rau-s of taxation had not been fixed. Therefore it is said that the taxes
had not then been imposed. The argument is that the
Alabama tax statute docs not "impose taxes'' but "secures
their payment'' and that unless taxes are imposed the
statute has no effect. The lien, it is urged, becomes
"fixed and final" only when the taxe> hav? been ascertained "by completion of levy and a—eminent."
There is no question however. a& the Government eonrede*, that the *tatc statute purports to impose a lien as
/</.. §§ 50, 72, pp 2S4. 292.
Vd,§7,p.2G3.
*/</.,§ 04, p. 2S,v
-/J., §11, p. 267.
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of October 1, 1936, for the taxes which by the process of
assessment were to become payable for the tax year 1937.
October first is fixed as the tax day, and as of that day
owners are to make their returns, values are to be fixed
and the taxes laid. There is no question that the State
thus undertakes to create an inchoate lien upon the lands
as of the tax day, a lien which is to be effective for the
amount of the taxes for the ensuing year as these are
fixed by the defined statutory method. This lien by the
state law is made effective not only as against the owners
on the tax day but also as against subsequent mortgagees
and purchasers. "It follows the land in the hands of
the vendee, all persons being chargeable with a knowledge
of its existence/' Driggers v. Cassaday, 71 Ala. 529, 534.
See, also, Swann v. State, 77 Ala. 545; State v. Alabama
Educational Foundation, 231 Ala. 11, 16; 163 So. 527.
Wefindnothing in the Federal Constitution which invalidates such a statutory scheme. Subsequent lienors and
purchasers have due notice of the tax liability imposed as
of the tax day and of the process of assessment, and that
liability, when its amount is definitely ascertained, relates
back to the day specified. We recognized the validity
of such a provision in New York v. Maclay. 2SS U. S. 290,
292, where we observed that a tax lien created in a similar
manner under a statute of New York "is effective for
many purposes though its amount is undetermined. It
is notice to mortgagees or purchasers, who are held to
loan or purchase at their own risk if they take their mortgages or deeds before the tax has been assessed or paid."
The precise decision in that case allowing priority to
the United States under R. S. 3466 for debts duo by an
insolvent corporation over claims of the Slate for franchise taxes due but not assessed or liquidated until after
a receivership, in no way detracted from the recognition
of the effectiveness of the state law creating a lien as
against mortgagees and purchasers. As the court said,
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"Against mortgagees and purchasers a lien perfected afterwards may take effect by relation as of the date of
the inchoate lien through which mortgagees and purchasers become chargeable with notice/' Id., p. 293. See
also, Osterberg v. Union Trust Co., 93 U. S. 424, 425, 428;
People v. Commissioners, 104 U. S. 466, 468. Compare
Shotwell v. Moore, 129 U. S. 590, 598. The lien in such
a case, though inchoate on the day specified, and maturing
when the extent of liability is ascertained by the statutory process, is similar in that respect, as the court said
in the Maclay case, to the lien of a transfer tax or duty
upon the estate of a decedent which is effective although
the amount is ascertained after death.
Our present inquiry is whether, assuming the validity
of the state statute creating a lien as of October 1, 1936,
as against other subsequent purchasers, it should be
deemed invalid as against the United States. The question is not whether such a lien could be enforced against
the United States. The fact that the United States had
taken title and that proceedings could not be taken
against the United States without its consent would protect it against such enforcement. But that immunity
would not be predicated upon the invalidity of the lien.
If in this instance title had been taken by the United
States in the summer of 1937 after the amount of the
taxes had been ascertained and the respective lien* wvre
eoneededly valid, still proceeding agair*t the Uniied
State- could not be prosecuted without it< eon-ot.
The Government is not content with :h:.r mca-mr uf
protection. The Government hrin:> thi^ -nit in ih»* vi.-w
that it is entitled to have a marketable title and it .-eeks
to remove the liens in question a^ clouds upon that title
which would interfere with the disposition of the lands
in the future. From that standpoint the Government
asks a decree declaring the invalidity of the liens and
enjoining the State from asserting any claim in the land*
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either adverse to the United States or to its successors in
title. We think that the United States is not entitled
to that relief. The United States took the conveyances
with knowledge of the state lawfixingthe lien as of October 1st. That law in creating such liens for the taxes
subsequently assessed in due course and making them
effective as against subsequent purchasers did hot contravene the Constitution of the United States and we perceive no reason why the United States, albeit protected
with respect to proceedings against it without its consent,
should stand, so far as the existence of the liens is concerned, in any different position from that of other purchasers of lands in Alabama who take conveyances on and
after the specified tax date. It is familiar practice for
grantees who take title in such circumstances to see that
provision is made for the payment of taxes and the Government could easily have protected itself in like manner.
Finding no constitutional infirmity in the state legislation, we think that the liens should be held valid.
We make no exception of the tract conveyed to the
United States on the tax day, October 1.193G, as we think
the state statute, as contended by the State, is to be
deemed effective from the moment the tax day began.
See Beck v. Johnson, 235 Ala. 323. 324: 170 So. 225.
Second. With respect to the tax ;»ales the case has a
different aspect. The proceedings in the county court
for the sale of the lands were taken and the decrees were
rendered after the United States had boconie the owner
of the tracts. A proceeding against property in which
the United States has an interest is a suit against the
United States. The Sinn, 7 Wall. 1'2, 154. The United
States was an indispensable party to proceedings for the
sale of the lands, and in the absence of its consent to the
prosecution of such proceedings, the county court was
without jurisdiction and its decrees, the tax sales and the
certificates of purchase issued to the State were void.
Minnesota v. United States, 305 U. >. 3S2, 3S6. While
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pleading to the contrary in its answer, the invalidity
of the tax sales is now conceded by the State.
The United States is entitled to a decree setting aside
the tax sales and the certificates of purchase, and in other
respects the complaint is dismissed.
It is so ordered.
CITY OF NEW YORK v. FEIRING, TRUSTEE IN
BANKRUPTCY.
CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
SECOND CIRCUIT.
No. 863. Argued May 7,1941.—Decided May 26, 1941.
1. The question whether an obligation to a State is a tax entitled to
priority under § 04 of the Bankruptcy Act is a federal question.
P. 2S5.
2. The Bankruptcy Act is of nationwide application and § 04 tbereot
is not to be construed or varied by th«* particular rharacterization by
local law of the states demand. P. 2So.
Provisions of the state law creating the obligation and decisions
of the state courts interpreting them are resorted to nor to learn
whether they have denominated the obligation a "tax" but to ascertain whether its incidents are such as to conMitute a tax within
the meaning of § 64.
.3. The tax imposed by the New York City Sales Tax Law «? a ux
on the seller within the meaninc of § 64 of the Bankruptcy ACT, ;:<
well as on the buyer, since both are made liable for payment m
hwitum and subject to distraint of their properv lor it.- ollecMon.
P. -JS7.
It is not any The le*s a t.»x la:d on the .-ellcr because th.» Ma:ire
places a like burden in the alternative on ih< pur«-ha-««r m- I,, < HKMit aJTor.Js to the selhr facilities of which he «! -i nut .:\..il iia.»-«•.! •«»
pa.-< the tax on to the buyer.
118 F.*.M:)J0, reversed.

jjost, p. 552. to review tlu* affirmant of an
order ol tin* i >i<ti irt Court refusing priority of payment, to
a tax claim asserted by the City of New York under $ 04
of the Bankruptcy Act.
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